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Questions Presented
I. Did the Secretary have the authority under 25 U.S.C. § 465 to acquire land and hold it in trust for the Native Molokinian Government as a "federally recognized" Indian tribe, despite Congress's subsequent recognition of the Molokini Nation?
II. Was the Native Molokinian Government entitled to receive federal acknowledgment through the administrative Office of Federal Acknowledgment process, even though the Native Molokinian Government extends membership to adopted children without Native Molokinian blood?
The Facts
The Native Molokinians are the original inhabitants of Molokini. 
The Proceedings
The State of Molokini appealed the Secretary of Interior's decision to take the 50,000 acres into trust for the Native Molokinan Government to the Interior Board of Indian Appeals, which upheld the Secretary's decision. (Problem 11.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the decision of the Secretary. (Id) The court stated that (1) The Native Molokinian Government constitutes a "federally recognized" Indian tribe, and the Secretary had the authority under 25 U.S.C. § 465 to acquire land and hold it in trust for the tribe, and (2) that the Native Molokinian Government possesses the inherent authority to define "descendancy" for membership purposes, and membership may include persons without Native Molokinian blood when there is a strong cultural basis for the inclusion, and the OFA has the authority to recognize such a group. 
S. C § 465 of the Indian Reorganization Act, because the Secretary has authority to hold land in trust for the federally recognized
Tribe.
First, The United States Government has recognized the special need to preserve Tribal lands since its passage of the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA") of 1934. In Carcieri v. Salazar, this Court held that in order to be eligible to receive land in trust under the IRA, a tribe had to be federally recognized at the time of its implementation. The Native Molokinian Government has been a federally recognized tribe since the Molokinian Homestead Act of 1921. Since the Tribe was federally recognized at the implementation of the IRA, through that Congressional legislation, the
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Secretary has authority to take land into trust for the Native Molokinian Government. Second, even if the Court finds that the Native Molokinan Government was not a federally recognized tribe in 1934, the 2013 Amendment to the IRA gives the Secretary broad discretion to determine which Indian Tribes should come within the scope of the Act. Reversing the Secretary's decision to grant the Native Molokinian Government's petition for their 50,000 acres to be placed into trust would be an affront to the longstanding principle of giving full deference to agency discretion. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) .
Finally, The Native Molokinian Government remains a federally recognized tribe despite Congress' subsequent recognition of the Molokini Nation. Taking away the Native Molokinian Government's trust land due to the federal recognition of the Molokini Nation would constitute a preference of one federally recognized tribe over another. Allowing the Molokini Nation preference over the Molokinian Government would be a violation of 25 U.S.C.A. § 476, which prohibits discrimination amongst Tribes. Preserving a tribal land base is essential for the survival of Indigenous groups. Id. The United States government has recognized the special need to preserve tribal lands since its passage of the Indian Reorganization Act ("IRA") of 1934. Id. The IRA was a means for Congress to address many of the past wrongs directed at American Indians and provide an opportunity to restore Native lands to their rightful owners. The Act codified in Title 25 section 465 of the United States Code Annotated gives the Secretary of Interior authority to acquire land for American Indians. 25 U.S.C.A. § 465.
II. The Ninth Circuit
The Native Molokinian Government has been a federally recognized tribe since 1934, and thus is entitled to benefit from the provisions of the IRA. Moreover, the Native Molokinian government remains a federally recognized tribe despite the recognition of the Molokini Nation.
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[Vol. In Carcieri, the Supreme Court held that because the Narragansett tribe was not a federally recognized tribe in 1934 when the Indian Reorganization Act was implemented, they were not eligible to receive land into trust under the Secretary's discretion. Id. at 383. The Narragansett tribe relinquished its tribal authority and was essentially assimilated into the State of Rhode Island during the late 19 th century. Id. at 383. Despite attempts to receive federal assistance in the early 1900's, the federal government rejected all of the Tribe's requests, citing the New England State's jurisdiction over the Tribe. Id. at 384. The Narragansett did not gain federal recognition until 1983. Id. After they received recognition, they petitioned the Secretary to put a parcel of land into trust, and, interpreting the statute's language to mean that trust land could be granted to any Indian tribe currently recognized by the federal government, the Secretary granted their request. Id. at 385. The Supreme Court held that was an impermissible interpretation of the definition of an "Indian" under the IRA, and that the Statute's language clearly refers to members of tribes that were under federal jurisdiction at the time the IRA was enacted. Id. at 391. Therefore, the Secretary did not have authority to take land into trust for the tribe.
Unlike the tribe in Carcieri, the members of the Native Molokinian Government were federally recognized in 1934 when the Indian Reorganization Act was implemented. The Homestead Act of 1921 federally recognized the Native Molokinian people and created a trust In 2013, Congress amended the Indian Reorganization Act and changed the 1934 language from tribes "now under federal jurisdiction," to "all federally recognized tribes." 25 U.S.C. § 465; (Problem 9.) While the original language of the IRA, unambiguously referred to Indian tribes recognized at the time the Act was implemented, the new language reflects Congress's attempt to give the statute broader reach. "All federally recognized tribes" either unambiguously refers to all tribes given federal recognition at any point, or is ambiguous language that should give the Secretary deference to determine its scope. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Recourses Def Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) . Therefore, even if the Court finds that the Native Molokinian Government was not federally recognized in 1934, they are now a federally recognized tribe. Therefore, the Secretary may put their land into trust. The federally recognized members of the Native Molokinian Tribe created the Native Molokinian Government, and therefore the Native Molokinian Government has been a federally recognized tribe since 1921.
However The Native Government met all the criteria for federal recognition. Id. In granting the Native Molokinian's request to put their land into trust, the Secretary has determined that the IRA's reach extends to the Native Molokinian Government. In light of the 2013 Amendment, the Secretary's decision to acquire land and hold it in trust for the recognized Native Molokinian Government should be given deference.
This Court should uphold the Secretary ofInterior's authority to take land into trust for the Molokinian Government under 25 U.S. C.A. § 465 and its 2013 amendment, because the decision was consistent with principles of Chevron deference.
When Congress delegates authority to an agency through legislation, the agency's secretary is granted deference to interpret the statute's reach. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) . If Congressional delegation of authority for an agency to interpret a statute is explicit, "[s]uch legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.
[If] delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit ... a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency." Id. at 843-44.
With respect to the Indian Reorganization Act, the Statute's language explicitly grants the Secretary with the decision to bring land into trust for Indian tribes. 25 C.F.R. § 151.3. The 2013 Amendment to the Act replaces the clear restrictive 1934 language with broad language giving the Secretary authority to take land into trust for "all federally recognized tribes." The language either clearly gives the Secretary authority to place land into trust for any recognized tribe, or is ambiguous and allows the Secretary broad discretion to determine which Tribes are eligible to receive trust land under the act. Therefore, under principals of Chevron deference, the Secretary's decision to bring that land into trust for the Native Molokini Tribe should be upheld.
In Navajo Nation v. HHS, the court held that the Secretary of HHS's interpretation of the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act ("ISDEAA") was valid, and therefore, under Chevron principals of deference the Secretary was not obligated to approve the Tribe's selfdetermination contract for Temporary Assistance for Needy Family
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("TANF") funds. 285 F.3d 864, 875 (9th Cir. 2002) . Congress implemented the TANF program in 1996, which provided grants to states and Indian Tribes that wanted to fund welfare programs for citizens in their jurisdiction. Id. at 867. The Navajo Nation used the ISDEAA, which provides programs for the benefit of Indians due to their special status as Indians, to apply for TANF funds. Id. at 867, 868. Not all federal programs can be transferred to the tribes through ISDEAA self-determination contracts. Id. The Secretary rejected the Tribe's application, stating that it went beyond the scope of the ISDEAA because the TANF program was not intended to be implemented for the particular benefit of Indians, but rather for all low-income peoples, and because the TANF funds did not meet the requirements of a self-determination contract as enumerated in ISDEAA.
Id. at 868. The Secretary "interpreted 'program[] . . . for the benefit of Indians because of their status as Indians' to mean that Indians must be the exclusive beneficiaries of the program in question." Id. at 869. The court determined that the legislation was ambiguous and that the Secretary's interpretation was one reasonable possibility, and therefore, the Secretary's decision should be given Chevron deference. Id. at 870. Congress gave the Secretary of HHS authority to interpret the ISDEAA's meaning and application. Therefore, the court must defer to that interpretation. Id. at
872.
Similarly to the statute at issue in Navajo Nation, Congress gave authority to interpret the Indian Reorganization Act and the ability to apply "the property is located within the exterior boundaries of the tribe's reservation or adjacent thereto, or within a tribal consolidation area; when the tribe already owns an interest in the land; or when the Secretary determines that the acquisition of the land is necessary to facilitate tribal self-determination, economic development, or Indian housing." 25 C.F.R. 151.3.
The Native Molokini Government is a federally recognized Indian tribe that purchased 50,000 acres of traditionally Native land, and therefore owns interest in that land. (Problem 1 8. When there is simultaneous recognition of tribes originating from the same ancestors, the government cannot give preference to one band over the other. 25 U.S.C.A. § 476 (f), (g). Moreover, the 2013 amendments to the Indian Reorganization Act when read in conjunction with section 476, must be interpreted in a manner that will not prefer one federally recognized tribe over another. The Secretary's decision to hold land in trust for the Native Molokinan Government should be upheld in order to ensure that the federally recognized tribe is not treated in a discriminatory manner.
In Carcieri v. Norton, the court held that construing the definition of an Indian to limit benefits only to tribes that were recognized at the time of the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 would constitute
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Published Congress and the Executive have determined that the Native Molokinian Government is a federally recognized tribe. However, even if the Native Molokinian Government is determined to be a splinter group of the Molokinan Nation, as the state contends, they have functioned from time immemorial as an autonomous tribal entity and therefore should remain a federally recognizable tribe. The Native Molokinian Government does not require a specific blood quantum and allows adopted children, regardless of their Native Molokinian ancestry, to be tribal members. The Native Molokinian Government has implemented these guidelines because it honors long standing traditional Native Molokinian practices. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rightly upheld the federal recognition of the Native Molokinian Government even though it extends membership to adopted children without Native Molokinian blood, and this Court should affirm the Secretary's decision to bring the 50,000 acres of land into trust for the Tribe. First, this Court should not review the Office of Federal Acknowledgment's ("OFA") decision to federally recognize the Native Molokinian Government because federal recognition is a nonjusticiable political question. Even if this Court were to scrutinize the OFA's recognition of the Native Molokinian Government, the OFA acted within its delegated authority and in accordance to federal regulations when it recognized the Native Molokinian Government. Second, as a federally recognized Tribe, the Native Molokinian Government retains the inherent sovereign power to self-govern. Determining tribal membership is a fundamental attribute of the Native Molokinian Government's sovereignty, and membership provisions are not subject to review by the courts, regardless of how a tribe determines who its members are. 
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of Indian tribes is a non-justiciable political question and should not be adjudicated by this Court, and (2) the OFA properly recognized the Native Molokinian Government even though its enrollment criteria extends membership to adopted children that may lack Native Molokinian blood.
This Court should not review the OFA's decision to recognize the Native Molokinian Government because recognition is a political question.
The authority for the OFA to recognize tribes derives from the Secretary Supreme Court precedent prohibits this Court from reviewing the OFA's decision to recognize the Native Molokinian Government because federal recognition is a non-justiciable political question. Courts continue to prohibit review of federal recognition based on the political question doctrine, and nothing distinguishes the instant case from any of the other cases barring adjudication. The State's challenge to the OFA's recognition of the Native Molokinian Government should end here.
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Even if this Court were to review the OFA's decision, it shouldfind that it properly recognized the Native Molokinian Government according to the Code of Federal Regulations and federal common law.
The only way the State could challenge the OFA's decision to recognize the Native Molokinian Government would be under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") "concerning the executive's recognition determination under 25 C.F.R. Part 83." Samish Indian Nation, 419 F.3d at 1369; Schaghticoke Tribal Nation, 587 F. Supp. 2d at 420. The State brings no such complaint. Even if this Court were to sua sponte review the OFA's recognition of the Native Molokinian Government under the APA, it is clear that the OFA acted within the guidelines provided by section 83 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
The Code of Federal Regulations, 25 C.F.R. §83.7, establishes the mandatory criteria for federal recognition, and permits the OFA to grant great deference to the petitioning tribe with respect to membership provisions. Section 83.7 allows tribes to present a wide range of evidence to establish that the membership "consists of individuals who descend from a historical Indian tribe." Id. at §83.7(e). Specifically, 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(e)(1)(iv) accepts "affidavits of recognition by tribal elders, leaders, or the tribal governing body identifying present members or ancestors of present members as being descendants of a historical tribe or tribes that combined and functioned as a single autonomous political entity," to prove descendancy for the purpose of membership.
In the instant case, the State conceded that the Native Molokinian Government meets all of the criteria for acknowledgment through the OFA process except for the membership requirement. (Problem 11.) It challenges the OFA's recognition based on the Native Molokinian Government's membership ordinance that extends membership to adopted children that retain a strong connection to the community even if they do not have Molokinian blood. (Id.) The State misinterprets the OFA's authority to determine what descendency means.
Nothing in the Code of Federal Regulations establishing the mandatory criteria for federal acknowledgment refers to blood quantum of any kind. 25 C.F.R. §83.7(e). Furthermore, 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(e)(1)(iv) accepts recognition by the Tribe as sufficient evidence to prove descendency. The Native Molokinian Government decided to extend membership to adopted children that do not necessarily have Native Molokinian blood out of respect for long-standing Native Molokinian tradition and customary social organization. (Problem 6.) The OFA had the authority to accept the Cherokee Law when deciding that a man lacking any Cherokee blood was "Indian" because he was adopted as a tribal member. It found that " [t] he Cherokee statutes make it clear that all white men legally married to Cherokee women and residing within the Nation are adopted citizens." Id. In affirming the applicability of Cherokee law, this Court reasserted that because the Cherokee Nation recognized him as a citizen, and because he asserted his citizenship, he "was a citizen by adoption, and, consequently, the jurisdiction over the offense charged herein is ... vested in the courts of that Nation." Id. at 662.
Nofire was the last Supreme Court case to address adoption of non-racial members as citizens for tribal jurisdiction, and clearly permits tribes to maintain enrollment criteria that extend membership to racially unrelated people. Like this Court deferred to Cherokee law when finding that a white man may be enrolled in a tribe and treated as an Indian for adjudicatory purposes in Nofire, this Court should respect the Native Molokinian Government's prerogative to extend membership to adopted children that may lack Native Molokinian blood in the instant case. In Nofire, this Court respected a tribal membership ordinance that acknowledged men who married Cherokee women as members without requiring any other cultural tie to the community. Here, the Native Molokinian Government only extends membership to children adopted by Tribal members that have maintained a significant cultural, social, or civic connection to the Native Molokinian community and wish to participate in the organization of the Native Molokinian governing entity. If this Court respected a tribal membership ordinance based on marriage alone, it should also respect the Native Molokinian Government's membership ordinance that seeks to extend membership based on respect for and deference to a long-standing, traditional Native Molokinian cultural practice of social organization.
Finally, a specific blood quantum is not dispositive of Indian status for adjudicatory purposes in criminal and child welfare cases, and from a policy perspective, should not be considered a requisite for enrollment here.
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[Vol. . 1988) . Thus, like in the criminal cases, a claimant may be enrolled or eligible to be enrolled, and may be the biological child of an enrolled member, and still lack Native blood if tribal enrollment doesn't require it. In short, not all people with Indian blood are legally considered to be Indian, and people lacking any Indian blood may still be considered legally Indian.
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The inconsistent application of the blood quantum and membership requirements in criminal and child welfare cases demonstrates that the question of "Indianness" is a broad one, and can neither be considered purely racial nor purely political. From a general policy perspective, if courts broadly determine who is Indian for adjudicatory purposes, tribes should also be able to broadly determine who its members are for purposes of civic and cultural participation. Accordingly, affirming the Native Molokinian Government's ability to enroll members that may lack Native Molokinian blood but maintain specific cultural ties to the community is consistent with the trend to broadly construe Indian status in the federal common law.
In summation, this Court is barred from reviewing the OFA's decision to recognize the Native Molokinian Government because federal recognition is a non-justiciable political question. Even if this Court were to review the OFA's finding based on the membership ordinance, it should find that the OFA properly recognizing the Native Molokinian Government according to federal regulations and federal common law. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the Ninth District Court of Appeals's decision to uphold the OFA's federal recognition of the Native Molokinian Government, and affirm the Secretary's placement of the 50,000 acres of land into trust for the Tribe.
B. The Native Molokinian Government appropriately exercised its inherent sovereign authority when it extended membership to adopted children without Native Molokinian blood, and accords with constitutional limitations on race-based classifications.
By recognizing the Native Molokinian Government, the federal government recognizes the Native Molokinian Government's sovereign authority to self-govern. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals properly held that the Native Molokinian Government had the right to define descendancy for membership purposes as part of its inherent sovereign authority to self-govern, and this Court should uphold the Secretary's decision to place 50,000 acres of land into trust for the Tribe because (1) this Court does not have the authority to review issues involving Native Molokinian Government membership, and (2) to reinstate a race-based policy for recognition would be to accept an unconstitutionally discriminatory policy.
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The Native Molokinian Government retains the inherent sovereign right to determine its membership, and this Court does not have the authority to review those provisions.
Tribes 
544, 564 (1981).
The inherent sovereign right of tribal self-governance includes the right to determine tribal membership. Id. This long-standing legal and political precedent exempts "purely intramural matters such as conditions of tribal membership" from federal statutes that otherwise apply to Indian tribes. . 1996) ). Because determining tribal membership is an essential attribute of sovereignty, challenges to enrollment provisions are not subject to review by this Court. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 72 (1978) .
In Santa Clara, id. 63, this Court found that it did not have the authority to adjudicate Tribal membership disputes. In Santa Clara, a female tribal member sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") because the Pueblo's enrollment ordinance granted membership to children of men who married outside of the Tribe, but refused membership to the children of women who married outside the Tribe. Id. at 51. This Court ruled in favor of tribal sovereignty and reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision, holding that it was "unpersuaded that a judicially sanctioned intrusion into tribal sovereignty is required to fulfill the purposes of the ICRA." Id. at 61. It found that regardless of the sensitive merits being adjudicated, the right for tribes to define membership had "long been recognized as central to its existence as an independent political community," and that "the role of courts in adjusting relations between and among tribes and their members" is limited. Id. at 72. In the end, this Court found that absent an act from Congress, the Pueblo was solely responsible for establishing the appropriate balance between ICRA F.3d at 787-88, two former members of the terminated Mooretown Rancheria were not able to re-enroll following reinstatement because of a tribal ordinance that narrowed membership criteria. In an attempt to skirt the clear Santa Clara precedent, instead of challenging the Tribe, the claimants challenged the Bureau of Indian Affairs ("BIA") under the APA. Id. at 789. The Court found that the BIA did not promulgate any rule by tacitly approving the new membership ordinance and did not implicate the APA, and that under Santa Clara, the BIA could not determine tribal membership even if it wanted to. Id. at 790-91. The Tribe has the "power to squeeze the plaintiffs out, because it has the power to define its own membership . . . For this reason, the BIA could not have defined the membership of Mooretown Rancheria, even if had tried." Id.
Accordingly, by challenging the Secretary's decision to take land into trust for the Native Molokinian Government vis-A-vis the Office of Federal Acknowledgment's ("OFA") recognition process, the State does not avoid Santa Clara in the case at bar. Just like the Pueblo in Santa Clara, the Native Molokinian Government is a federally recognized Indian nation that retains the inherent sovereign power to determine who its members are. (Problem $ 6.) After receiving State recognition under Act 200, the Native Molokinian Government independently organized to seek federal recognition under the OFA. (Id.) The OFA officially recognized the Native Molokinian Government in January 2016 (id.). As demonstrated above, the OFA properly recognized the Native Molokinian Government, and officially established the Tribes' sovereign authority to self-govern. If this Court was able to uphold the Santa Clara Pueblo's sovereign right to sustain a blatantly discriminatory membership ordinance, it should also uphold the Native Molokinian Government's sovereign authority to implement an ordinance that extends membership to culturally affiliated adopted children. 913 (9th Cir. 2009 ). This Court is obliged to follow this precedent, and should uphold the Native Molokinian Government's sovereign authority to define tribal membership.
To reinstate a race-based policy for Native Molokinian recognition would be to accept an unconstitutionally discriminatory policy.
Federally recognized tribes are privy to certain statutory and regulatory benefits that stem from their unique government-government relationship with the federal government. 25 C.F.R. § 83.2. Policies that favor Indians over non-Indians are constitutionally permissible when preference "is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities," based on a long history of diplomatic relations with the federal government. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555-54 (1974) . Because Indian status is political and not racial, special treatment need only be rationally related to "Congress's unique obligation toward the Indians." Id. at 555. On the other hand, if a policy granting special treatment to Native people is primarily race-based, it will likely be struck down on equal protection grounds. Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 497 (2000) .
For example, in Rice this Court struck down an ordinance that limited voting in the Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA") to people of native Hawaiian, "or as descendants of not less than one-half part of the races inhabiting the islands before 1778," and Hawaiian ancestry, or "descendants of the peoples inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands in 1778," under the 15f Amendment. It distinguished Mancari by finding that granting voting privileges according to Hawaiian ancestry was merely a proxy for race, because "[tihe inhabitants shared common physical characteristics, and by 1778 they had a common culture," and because " [t] 
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used ancestry as a racial definition and for a racial purpose." Id. at 496. Because OHA's categorization was racial and not political, this Court found the voting provision failed because "it rests on the demeaning premise that citizens of a particular race are somehow more qualified than others to vote on certain matters." Id. at 497.
Ironically, the State asks that this Court reverse the Secretary's decision to bring the 50,000 acres of former Molokinian land into trust for the Tribe because the Native Molokinian Government is not distinguished by race alone. (Problem 7.) The State seeks to reinstate recognition by the criteria established in the 1921 Homestead Act, which defines a Native Molokinian as "any descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting Molokini previous to 1778." (Problem 2, 9.) The criterion the State asks this Court to establish is strikingly similar to the racial categorization of native Hawaiians that was struck down in Rice. In contrast, the current membership provisions promulgated by the Native Molokinian Government complies with the Rice precedent because extending membership to adopted children that may not have the requisite blood deems that delineation political, and not racial. Although a challenge to legislation recognizing an Indian tribe is not the same as challenging a voting ordinance, this Court should consider the implications of Rice in potential challenges to legislation that may favor Native Molokinian people in the future.
In conclusion, the Ninth District Court of Appeals properly upheld the federal recognition of the Native Molokinian Government because the Native Molokinian Government retains the inherent sovereign right to determine descendancy or membership purposes. This Court should affirm the Native Molokinian Government's current membership provisions because to accept the State's appeal to reinstate a race-based policy for recognition would be to accept an unconstitutionally discriminatory policy that would likely be struck down in the future. Accordingly, this Court should respect the sovereign authority of the Native Molokinian Government, adhere to current Supreme Court precedent that prohibits statutes favoring Native people based on race alone, and uphold the Secretary's decision to place the 50,000 acres of former Molokinian land in trust for the Tribe.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court should affirm the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and uphold the Secretary of Interior's decision to put 50,000 acres of land into trust for the Native Molokinian Nation in
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